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The concept of utility is the core component of many foundational theories in social sciences. 
It has evolved from a philosophical belief that people seek happiness and satisfaction to a 
mathematically derived theory in economics and finance. Beginning with a brief review of the 
developments in the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and its applicability in equity pricing, this 
paper includes a critical appraisal of relevant theoretical and empirical studies from the fields 
of financial economics and behavioural studies, with a particular focus on the the Consumption 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM). 
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Individuals are faced with numerous issues which necessitate making choices. Most everyday 
problems are solved through quick responses based on intuition and feelings. While some 
which are more complex with a monetary consequence need to be tackled methodically based 
on analysis and reasoning (Kahneman and Frederick 2002). Unsurprisingly, this complexity is 
further accentuated when the available alternatives have risk implications or decisions are made 
under uncertainty. However, whether it is a decision to buy a new mobile-phone or to allocate 
wealth across investment avenues for retirement-planning, the common aim in most observable 
cases is to obtain highest value for a given price.      
Early theoretical developments in economics advocated that individuals make decisions by 
ranking the choices based on perceived utility and select the one that provides most usefulness 
(Stigler 1950). The Expected Utility Theory (EUT) generalised this concept of utility 
maximisation under the microeconomic paradigm of rationality and served as a foundation to 
model decision-making with risky choices or uncertain outcomes. Apart from the assumption 
of a rational economic agent who makes consistent decisions by objectively valuing the 
expected utility of probable outcomes, EUT has been academically evaluated as both a positive 
and a normative theory (Mongin 1997). Therefore, even if it is primarily known as a descriptive 
theory based on observations - How do individuals actually make decisions - and consequently 
applied to make predictions; economists have appraised the EUT as prescriptive - How should 
individuals ideally make decisions. Section 2 reviews the developments in EUT and critically 
examines its ability to explain individuals’ decision-making. 
Theories in economics have made a significant impact on academic research in business and 
management, more so in corporate finance. The Portfolio Theory states that investors seek to 
maximise returns for a given level of preferred risk or alternatively minimise risk to achieve a 
certain return (Markowitz 1952, 1959). Undoubtedly, the notion of utility maximisation in EUT 
is critical to achieve an optimal investment portfolio through diversification1. However, 
behavioural finance theorists reject the assertion of generalised rationality. The law of 
diminishing marginal utility is foundational in economics and also a vital constituent of EUT. 
It is based on a perceptive notion that additional consumption provides incremental utility at a 
decreasing rate. This concept too is relevant in investment management as investors prefer 
more wealth (higher returns) and fluctuations in wealth lead to change in risk aversion. Stable 
utility functions can be defined to understand investors’ preferences about risk and returns 
(Merton 1992). However, empirical findings of some equity pricing studies do not conform to 
the EUT hypothesis. Section 3 evaluates the applicability of EUT in financial asset pricing 
through the CCAPM. 
 
 
1 Bernoulli (1738, translated in 1954: 30) thought of diversification to minimise risk, “It is 
advisable to divide goods which are exposed to some danger into several portions rather than 
to risk them all together.” 
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2. Developments in EUT 
Daniel Bernoulli’s definition of expected utility predates the formalised version of EUT applied 
today; “determination of the value of an item must not be based on its price, but rather on the 
utility it yields” (Bernoulli 1738, translated in 1954: 24). He proposed that every individual 
assigns a unique subjective value to each outcome which is significantly lower than the 
maximum monetary pay-off. Moreover, he explained the risk aversion in human behaviour, as 
individuals would prefer to preserve wealth even if the outcome is highly probable and 
promises high returns. His explanation of concave utility function is the bedrock of asset 
pricing theories in financial economics. However, Bernoulli’s presumption of a cardinal utility 
scale wasn’t well received by the neoclassical economists (Starmer 2000). They argued that 
merely sorting the preferences irrespective of the change in magnitude of utility can sufficiently 
explain decision-making. Hence, the 20th century definition of ordinal utility assumes 
continuity in choice wherein preference is unaffected by a small change in probability of the 
outcome (Binmore 2008). 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (VNM) (1944), in their seminal work that introduced the 
Game Theory, initiated the mathematical translation of Bernoulli’s ideas about utility in a way 
that generalised the individual choice behaviour. The most crucial condition that facilitated the 
generalisation is rationality. It is assumed that an (any) individual possesses complete 
information about all possible outcomes, their respective probabilities and makes a consistent, 
logical choice. Savage (1954) formulated a significant variation of EUT, namely ‘Subjective 
EUT’ that differentiated uncertainty from riskiness and assessed the expected utility of 
outcomes with unknown probabilities. Marschak (1950) and Herstein & Milnor (1953) defined 
a formal framework for people’s preferences based on a set of axioms and derived the VNM 
theorem of expected utility. EUT was fortified further by Fishburn (1970) and Kreps (1988) 
among others through additional postulations. Apart from the basic assumptions of transitivity 
and completeness, the two crucial axioms are; one, outcome with higher probability is preferred 
and two, preference order of any two outcomes is independent from the preference for any 
other outcome (Hargreaves Heap 1992). While the axiomatic, numerical expression of utility 
provided convenience in calculation, the conceptual appeal ensured wider acceptance of EUT. 
However, the very foundational elements of EUT were scrutinised, leading to anomalies and 
consequently, alternative theories such as the Random Utility Theory (McFadden 1980), 
Weighted Utility Theory (Chew and MacCrimmon 1979) and Multi Attribute Utility Theory 
(Loomes and Sudgen, 1986) (Starmer 2000). 
Allais (1953), through a series of experiments, observed an unanticipated change in 
respondents’ preference when the probabilities of two choices were scaled down by a common 
factor (Blavatskyy 2013). This ‘Common Consequence Effect’ violated both the rationality 
assumption and the independence axiom. Based on Allais’ paradoxical results, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) proposed the much famed Prospect Theory. Their experiments illustrated that 
respondents preferred a gain of $3000 with a probability of 1 to $4000 with a probability of 
0.8. Hence, people are highly averse to losses as they prefer certain outcomes over those 
probable. They argued, building on the Markowitz (1959) mean-variance model of Portfolio 
Theory, that individuals, in order to control losses, prefer the outcome with higher return, if it’s 
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counterbalanced by a considerably low variance. However, same respondents chose $4000 gain 
with probability of 0.25 to $3000 with 0.2, thus violating the EUT assumption of high 
probability preference and the certainty principle, as the expected gain outweighed the 
relatively higher variability. Furthermore, they suggested an interpretation of utility conditional 
to a probable gain or loss. Here too, they derived from Markowitz (1952), “He was first to 
propose that utility be defined on gains and losses rather than on final asset positions” 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 276); a reliable evidence that economics, finance and 
behavioural studies are interdependent.  
Following Prospect Theory that discovered the impact of loss aversion on expected utility, 
numerous studies attempted to theorise decision-making with an all-encompassing yet liberal 
adaptation of EUT. While some conducted behavioural experiments, others explored the utility 
functions with non-probabilistic and non-additive characteristics. Quiggin (1982) and 
Schmeidler (1989) incorporated inherent beliefs and attitudes like optimism or negativity in 
their ‘Rank Dependent EUT’. They proposed that individuals assign a ‘decision weight’ to 
every outcome which is contingent on how favourable it is to them compared to other outcomes 
and then rank the outcomes accordingly. Later, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) adopted this 
idea of ranking based on subjective weights and cumulative probabilities to develop the 
Cumulative Prospect Theory which satisfied the vital monotonicity assumption (more is 
preferred) of conventional EUT. Thaler (1985) observed that selling prices are usually higher 
than buying prices because the value of seller’s prospective loss outweighs the value of buyer’s 
probable gain. He argued that individuals are loss averse and thus evaluate expected utility with 
respect to a reference price or existing wealth position. He termed this as the ‘endowment 
effect’ that generates ‘transaction utility’. Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) found that 57% 
respondents chose to purchase an insurance against repairs charges of telephone wiring with a 
0.005 probability of incidental damage. Given that the monthly payment was higher than the 
probable cost, this choice breached the EUT assumption of rational and utility-maximising 
agents. 
Evidently, EUT economists received a compelling rebuttal from behavioural theorists and 
psychologists. As a result, the recent research on choice behaviour has significantly departed 
from the neo-classical description of utility. Yet, the findings of laboratory experiments have 
been inconsistent and don’t necessarily facilitate the modelling of decision-making. For 
instance, Brooks and Zank (2005) exemplified that women are more loss-averse than men. 
However, Harrison and Rutstrom (2009) found no significant impact of socio-demographic 
factors. They concluded that Prospect Theory and EUT have similar explanatory power, albeit 
in diverse ‘task domains’. Ramos et al (2011) showed that Prospect Theory predicts travellers’ 
choice of routes more reliably than EUT. Similar studies that examined the applicability of 
EUT in varied areas such as health, agriculture and taxation and compared it with Non-EUT 
alternatives have yielded mixed results (Perpinan et al 2009; Dhami and Nowaihi 2010; Just 
and Peterson 2010; Bombardini and Trebbi 2012). Given the range of conflicting verdicts on 
EUT, parallel attempts are made to either amend or strengthen the original EUT by VNM and 
Savage (La-Mura 2009; Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky 2010; Hu 2013). An exhaustive 
review of theoretical advances, empirical analyses and experimental studies that respectively 
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built on, assessed and contradicted the EUT to explain the individual choice behaviour is 
beyond the scope of this essay. Nevertheless, it is apparent that a plethora of academic research 
emerged from the EUT leading to its practical applications in an array of diverse fields, 
particularly in equity pricing.  
 
3. EUT and Equity Pricing 
When investors purchase equities or bonds, they intend to achieve an optimal risk-return trade-
off and smooth their consumption. In doing so, they make a critical wealth-allocation decision 
to either consume (invest) today or save for future consumption. Thus, consumption patterns 
of investors or their investment choices influence the prices of financial assets. Predictably, 
asset pricing models in the current financial economics paradigm draw from the EUT and 
assume rational investors with precise utility functions who trade securities in frictionless 
markets. One such model is the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model2 (CCAPM). It posits 
that, at equilibrium (optimal market efficiency), the loss of utility accepted by an investor in 
purchasing an asset today, equals the increased expected utility (higher consumption) in the 
next period when the asset yields returns (Equation 1) (Danthine and Donandson 2014). The 
incremental returns expected in the future period is the premium for bearing additional risk or 
the Equity Risk Premium (ERP) in case of stocks. Pit, 𝑢’(Ct) =  Et [β, 𝑢’(Ct+1), Rt+1]                                                                                                 (1) 
Where, Pit, is price of asset i at time t and u’(Ct) is marginal utility of current consumption. 
Their product reflects the loss in utility (forgone consumption) faced today through investment 
in asset i. β is the subjective discount factor of future consumption. It measures how keen the 
investor is to consume at time t as opposed to time t+1. Considering, a higher beta value 
increases total expected utility (Et), high beta reflects the investor’s desire to postpone 
consumption. While, u’(Ct+1), is the marginal utility of consumption at time t+1; Rt+1, is the 
future returns from asset i. Finally, Et is the utility gain at time t+1, as expected at time t, 
through investment in asset i at price Pit. 
Although CCAPM implements the intuitive reasoning of EUT, the early empirical studies 
conducted using the CCAPM challenge its ability to price equities. Hansen and Singleton 
(1983) built a widely tested variation of CCAPM, wherein the representative agent’s utility of 
consumption is time separable. They failed to explicate the cross sectional returns on stock and 
bonds using the U.S. consumption data. The seminal paper of Mehra and Prescott (1985) found 
that the high observed ERP could not be justified using the CCAPM. The general consensus 
on the value of co-efficient of risk aversion for an average investor is in the range of 1 to 3. 
However, a high ERP of 6% demanded by the U.S. investors in the period 1889-1978 implied 
an exorbitantly high risk aversion of 30 to 40. While, Mehra and Prescott (1985) conceded that 
an expected utility and consumption based model to estimate ERP is theoretically sound; their 
 
2 It was developed with vital contributions from Rubinstein (1976), Lucas (1978), Breeden 
(1979) and Grossman and Shiller (1981) 
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empirical findings were termed as ‘The ERP Puzzle’ which to this date remains an unexplained 
anomaly. This necessitated modifications to the utility function of the representative, rational 
investor as assumed by the EUT. 
The standard general equilibrium model of asset pricing based on Lucas’ (1978) pure exchange 
economy assumes that an investor’s utility of consumption in any given period is independent 
of its consumption in either preceding or following periods. However, given the negligible 
empirical evidence in support of CCAPM’s suitability to estimate expected returns (or the 
ERP), Sunderesan (1989) and Constantinides (1990) suggested the inclusion of the ‘Habit 
Formation’ aspect into the model. They argued that marginal utility of future consumption is 
affected by past consumption and hence it is not independent. Therefore, the utility function in 
equation 1 is modified from 𝑢’(Ct) to 𝑢’(Ct, Xt) where Xt is the habit that varies over multiple 
periods. Furthermore, the model assumed that future consumption of any investor is affected 
by the past choices of only that individual and any outside influence is disregarded. While they 
described this factor as ‘internal habit’, it is expected to be relatively inelastic to change in 
future consumption. Although, Constantinides (1990) disproved the ERP Puzzle by justifying 
the high ERP with low risk aversion, Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) questioned his model as it 
required a consumption growth series with positive autocorrelation. 
Abel (1990) proposed an alteration to include the ‘external habit’ formation or what he 
described as ‘catching up with the Joneses’. He argued that the marginal utility of future 
consumption is impacted by the aggregate consumption lagged by one period but is 
independent of individual’s choices. This model found that higher risk aversion reduces the 
risk-free rate thus overestimating the ERP. Furthermore, incorporating the assumptions made 
by Mehra and Prescott (1985) lead to a higher variance in risk-free rate, increased its covariance 
with stock returns and consequently generates higher ERP. Although, Abel (1990) claimed his 
model solved the ERP Puzzle, the ‘time complementarity’ feature leads to a more volatile 
marginal utility of future consumption as it is now derived from consumption from an earlier 
period. This leads to higher volatility in risk-free rate, making it inconsistent with historical 
interest rates which have been relatively steady (Abel 1999). 
A more plausible version of the above alterations was presented by Campbell and Cochrane 
(1999). They included the external habit formation factor and variable risk aversion relative to 
consumption, unlike their predecessors who assume a constant risk aversion. They showed that 
the time variability characteristic coupled with smooth consumption and stable risk-free rate 
generates more reliable estimates of ERP. The intuitive logic for this argument is; unexpected 
shocks to consumption that lead to higher risk aversion reduce consumption up to a level where 
an investor cannot trim it any further due to ingrained habits. Subsequently, stock prices decline 
and drive up the ERP. Although fairly robust, they were forced to maintain a constant risk-free 
rate in order to achieve stability, which is the opposite extreme of the inconsistency in Abel’s 
model (Guvenen 2005). 
However, as it is rooted in the expected utility hypothesis, CCAPM’s ability to explain 
investors’ decisions has been questioned. Some argued that investors evaluate income and 
consumption in isolation (Shiller 1999; Welch 2000); while others suggested that consumption 
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data in unreliable (Black, 1990) and wealth is more appropriate given its higher volatility 
(Vivian, 2007). Considering the ERP Puzzle still exists after 30 years, one can argue that the 
notion of rational economy underpinning CCAPM is flawed and non-standard investor 
preferences should be included.  
 
4. Conclusion 
EUT introduced simple, intuitive concepts of rational expectations and utility as fundamental 
ingredients for decision-making. However, it received criticism for this very simplicity that 
ignored the intricacies of the often unpredictable and idiosyncratic human behaviour. This 
criticism is based on the argument that individuals have distinctive tastes, varying level of risk 
aversion, do not possess all the information, have limited computational ability and hence rely 
on crude techniques such as rule-of-thumb. But the argument has proved inadequate as it is 
largely supported by the results of laboratory experiments that test individuals’ choice 
behaviour in hypothetical scenarios and not when they make real, practical decisions.  
While there is some evidence to question the descriptive ability of EUT, the unconventional 
framework has limitations in modelling decision-making in a way that can be widely applied 
and thus is unable to present a robust Non-EUT alternative. There is little doubt that the 
expected utility hypothesis, which has developed over a period of 300 years, has successfully 
withstood scrutiny for the past five decades. Until there is an appropriate substitute, EUT 
undeniably outranks others as a normative theory that simply states individuals should behave 
rationally and seek value.   
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